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RECENT TRENDS
PROHIBITION OF MARIJUANA USAGE
The controversy surrounding the weed-like
marijuana plant continues.- Recent challenges
to laws prohibiting the use and possession
of marijuana have met with varied responses
which are sometimes difficult to rationalize.
People v. Serra2 represents one successful
challenge. That case involved a Michigan stat-
ute which created a presumption that posses-
sion of more than two ounces of marijuana im-
plies an intent to distribute.3 The defendants
were charged with possession of marijuana
with intent to deliver. This followed the sei-
zure of several marijuana plants from their
yard along with various containers of dried
marijuana in their home. Affirming an appel-
late court dismissal of the charge, the Michi-
gan supreme court held that the challenged
statute violated both the privilege against self-
incrimination and the defendants' rights to due
process. According to the court, a presumption
is a legislative determination that gives force
of law to an otherwise ordinary inference. The
presumption created by the statute in question
differed from allowable presumptions because it
"involve[d] an inference from the fact of pos-
session to the fact of the possessors' intent
rather than some fact which can be shown in-
dependent of the defendants' state of mind." 4
To rebut this inference the defendants were
forced to choose between either foregoing their
fifth amendment rights to remain silent or tak-
I There are several good histories of the Ameri-
can attempt to regulate marijuana. See e.g., Bonnie
& Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the
Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal
History of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56
VA. L. REv. 971 (1970). Recent additions to the
literature in the field include Balme, The Role of
the Criminal Justice System with Respect to Mar-
ihuana and Hashish, 1 CRIMINAL JUSTICE QUAR-
TERLY 176 (1973) ; Bartels, Better Living
Through Legislation: The Control of Mind-Alter-
ing Drugs, 21 KAN. L. REv. 439 (1973) ; Drug Of-
fenses and Decriminalization: A Symposium, 3
HUMAN RIGHTS - (1973).
2 _ Mich. _, 223 N.W2d 28 (1974).
3 MICH. CoanP. LAws ANN. § 335.341(2)
(1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 18.1070(41) (2)
(1971).
4 _ Mich. at , 223 N.W.2d at 32.
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ing the risk that the jury would draw the in-
ference encouraged by the statute. This forced
choice gave rise to the constitutional infirmity.
For good measure the Michigan court also
found there to be no rational connection be-
tween the proven fact of possession and the
presumed fact of intent to deliver. 5
A Montana defendant found that state's su-
preme court less receptive than Michigan's in
responding to his chanllenge to a statute which
created a presumption that cultivation of mari-
juana is legally equivalent to the criminal sale of
marijuana0 In State ex rel. LeMieux v. District
Court7 the Montana supreme court held that the
"cultivation" of marijuana comes within the
meaning of the word "sale." Therefore the court
did not need to reach the question of whether
there was a rational connection between the cul-
tivation of the plant and the prohibited conduct
of selling the product.
The Michigan decision in Serra can be ra-
tionalized by certain practical considerations.
First, in 1973 the National Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws recommended the decrim-
inalization of possession of and distribution
of small quantities of marijuanas An eviden-
tiary rule promulgated pursuant to the 1973 rec-
ommendations would create a presumption that
possession of less than one ounce of marijuana
would be intended for personal use.9 The court
5 The court stated that the degree of certainty
necessary to sustain the presumed fact where statu-
tory presumptions are at issue has not been firmly
settled by the United States or Michigan high courts.
- Mich. at -, 223 N.W.2d at 35. Regardless of
which test used, this court would have found the
presumption involved invalid. See generally
Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970)
(presumed fact must flow from the proven fact be-
yond a reasonable doubt) ; Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6 (1969) (presumed fact must be more
likely than not to flow from the proven fact on
which it must depend) ; United States v. Romano,
382 U.S. 136 (1956) (mere presence at whiskey
still insufficient to support presumption of pos-
session).6 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 54-132 (Supp. 1971).
7 Mont..--, 531 P.2d 665 (1975).
8 UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 409
(Supp. 1973), cited in - Mich. at---, 223 N.W.2d
at 30 n.4.
9 See - Mich. at _ 223 N.W.2d at 31 n.5.
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may have felt that the legislature's intention
would be to follow the Uniform Act, even
though the legislature had deviated from the
Uniform Act with this presumption under
challenge. Additionally, viewing the challenged
Michigan statute in light of the Uniform Act
may have convinced the court of the statute's
infirmity.
Secondly, denying the prosecutor the use of
the "evidentiary crutch" created by the pre-
sumption is not likely to impede appropriate
prosecutions. Where a large amount of mari-
juana is involved, the inference of intent to sell
is there for the jury to draw without the aid of
the legislature. Strikinng the presumption shifts
the burden of going forward with the evidence
of intent to the prosecution. As the court sug-
gests,"0 the prosecutor, rather than the defend-
ant, could put on expert witnesses and ac-
quaintances of the defendant in order to show
the requisite intent.
The Montana decision is more difficult to ra-
tionalize. Dissenting Justices Haswell and
Daly found that the statute did indeed create a
presumption of sale from mere cultivation and
that this presumption was clearly unconstitu-
tional under Tot v. United States."' Using a
"plain meaning" test, the word "sale" would
encompass such acts as delivery or disposition
or exchange. 2 Only by judicial torture of the
word "sale" can "cultivation" be considered a
synonym.13 The court would have been on
sounder ground had it cited to evidence show-
ing that most cultivators in fact sell the plants
once they are grown.
One consistently unsuccessful method of
challenging marijuana regulations is to attack
as irrational the state's classification of the
cannabis plant and its various products as a
0 __ Mich. at ___ 223 N.W.2d at 34.
1319 U.S. 463 (1943). A federal statute pro-
vided that mere possession of a pistol coupled with
a prior criminal conviction create a presumption
that the pistol had been acquired in interstate com-
merce. In holding that the statute violated due
process, the Court determined that there must be a
rational connection between the fact proved and the
fact presumed. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S.
6 (1969).
12VEBSTER's NEV INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2203 (2d ed. 1945).
"3 The reader interested in an exploration of
this form of judicial reasoning can profit by read-
ing L. FULLER, LEGAL FicwroNs (1967).
narcotic. At least five state courts have re-
cently been presented with and rejected this
argument.'14 The supreme court of Missouri in
State v. Burrow 5 adds that state's court to the
list of the unconvinced. The Missouri statute
challenged in this case put marijuana in the
same class as the so-called hard drugs of her-
oin, opium and morphine. The penalty for vio-
lating the law was not less than five years nor
more than life imprisonment for simple posses-
sion or sale.' 6 The sale of hallucinogenic
drugs is listed in a separate statute which
provides for a considerably less severe
punishment.' 7 Defendant Burrow, convicted of
the sale of four ounces of marijuana to a po-
lice officer, sought to overturn his sentence of
five years by attacking the statutory scheme on
equal protection grounds. Burrows argued that
the scientific community is in virtual agree-
ment that marijuana is not a narcotic 8 and
that its effects are both very different and
"milder." Since the evil toward which the stat-
ute is directed at eliminating is the "high" or
euphoria produced by the drug and its associ-
ated abuses, drugs which produce similar
"highs" should be classed together and those
that produce different effects should be classed
separately. To do otherwise would "lay an un-
equal hand on those who have committed in-
trinsically the same quality of offense and ster-
ilizes one and not the other [which is] as an
invidious discrimination [as selecting] a par-
1 4 Warren v. State, 52 Ala. App. 35, 288 So. 2d
817 (1973); State v. Wadsworth, 109 Ariz. 59,
505 P-2d 230 (1973); People v. Stark, 157 Colo.
59, 400 P.2d 923 (1965) ; Borras v. State, 229 So.
2d 244 (Fla. 1969); Reyna v. State, 434 S.W.2d
362 (Tex. Crim. 1968).
15 514 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1974).
16 Mo. REv. STAT. § 195.017 (Supp. 1973). The
penalties are for possession of not more than 35
grams and for the delivery of not more than 25
grams.
17 Illegal sale of hallucinogenic substances is
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for
from two to ten years, or by confinement in the
county jail for a term of not more than one year,
or by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by both
fine and confinement. Mo. Rxv. STAT. § 195.270
(Supp. 1973).
18 The Missouri court noted that the defendant
presented "considerable authority in support" of
this proposition. 514 S.W.2d at 590. There are
many excellent scientific treatises on the classifica-




ticular race or nationality for oppressive
treatment." '9
In rejecting this argument the Burrow court
found that the medical evidence is not nearly
complete or unanimous in the rejection of mar-
ijuana's classification as a hard drug,20 and
that the prevelance of the use of the drug jus-
tified the more severe penalty.21 The court
cited no authority for this position.
22
Another frequently losing argument used in
attacking convictions under laws concerning
marijuana is that the federal statute prohibit-
ing the possession of marijuana" applies to
only one of three species of marijuana, caniabis
sativa L. However, -the federal district court of
the western district of Wisconsin, in United
States v. Lewallen,2 has recently held that the
government's failure to prove that the defendant
19 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942). A per curiam decision by the Illinois su-
preme court in People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338,
275 N.E.2d 407 (1971), accepted a similar argu-
ment. There the court held that the Illinois Nar-
cotic Drug Act, which provided for a mandatory
ten year minimum sentence on first conviction of a
marijuana offense rather than under the Drug
Abuse Control Act which provided for a maxi-
mum jail term of one year on first conviction, vio-
lated equal protection. The Burrow court noted
that the Illinois legislature had changed the treat-
ment of marijuana offenders before the case was
decided, making the constitutional argument super-
fluous.
20 The court cites to no authority except Chief
Justice Underwood's dissent in People v. McCabe,
49 Il. 2d 338, 352-53, 275 N.E2d 407, 414
(1971). The Burrow court either was not made
aware of or chose to ignore overwhelming evi-
dence to the contrary. For an excellent layman's
guide to the most recent scientific developments
regarding marijuana see Brecher, Marijuana: The
Health Questions-Is Marijuana as Damaging as
Recent Reports Make It Appear? 40 CONSUMER
REPORTS 143 (1975).
One noted authority has suggested that rather
than concentrating on what the drug is, we should
be concerned with the behavioral consequences re-
sulting from use. Contemporary Problems of Drug
Abuse: A National Symposium for Law and Med-
ical Students, 18 ViLL. L. REv. 787,820 (1973).
21 The court heard no evidence on how wide-
spread the use of the various classified drugs
actually was. Apparently, it took judicial notice of
the fact. 514 S.W.2d at 592.
22 Some of the questions involving statutory
classifications may be answered in Delp v. Ohio,
- Ohio , - N.E.2d - (1974), petition for
cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3374 (U.S. Dec. 26, 1974)
(No. 810).
2321 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) (1970).
24 385 F. Supp. 1140 (W.D. Wis. 1974). -
possessed cannabis saliva L. warranted a rever-
sal of his conviction. Striking a blow for judi-
cial individualism the judge noted that he was
aware of scientific treatises and expert botani-
cal taxonomists that do not support his
finding.25 However, no such testimony was of-
fered in his court. The court also recognized
that all species of marijuana, including canna-
bis sativa L., cannabis indica Lan. and ruder-
alis Jan. contain the euphoria producing agent
tetrahydrocannabinol. But he found the legisla-
tive history unclear as to whether it was the
"high" itself or the particular plant type which
was to be prohibited. Indeed, ignoring the de-
cisions of three circuit courts of appeals, 2 6 the
district judge found that the congressional in-
tent was clear that marijuana of a type other
than cannabis sativa L. was not prohibited
27
Since there is no reliable biochemical or spec-
trographic method for distinguishing between
the various species of marijuana other than to
view the growing plant itself,28 the decision in
Lewallen could present a severe set-back to
marijuana prosecutions. However, the over-
whelming verdict from other circuits is that
the Controlled Substances Act29 applies equally
to all species of marijuana. 0 Since it is the
25 Botanists now generally agree that there is
but one species, cannabis sativa, and many un-
stable varieties or races which are, in effect,
ecotypes, i.e., hemp seems . . . to differ from
or approach the characteristic type in response
to the conditions under which it is growing.
GaiNsPooN, supra note 18, at 35. Other author-
ity can be cited to show the existence of three
types. Compare Schultes, Random Thoughts and
Queries on the Botany of Cannabis, in C. JoYcE
& S. CURRY, THE BOTANY AND CHm sMxSRY oF
CANNABIS 11-38 (1970), with Schultes, Klein,
Plowman & Lockwood, Cannabis: An Example
of Taxonomic Neglect, 23 HARv. BoTANNicAL
MUSEUM LEAFLETS 325 (1974). See also R.
ScHuLTs & A. HOFFMAN, THE BOTANY AND
CHEMISTRY OF HALI.UCINOGENS 58 (1973).
26 United States v. Honneus, 508 F.2d 566 (1st
Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Gaines, 489 F.2d 690
(5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Rothberg, 480
F.2d 534 (2d dir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857
(1973), aff'g 351 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) ;
United States v. Moore, 446 F.2d 448 (3d cir.
1971), aff'g 330 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
27 "This statute is not vague; it applies to can-
nabis sativa L. and to nothing else." 385 F. Supp.
at 1143.
28 United States v. Walton, - F.2d - (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
2921 U.S.C. § 802(15) (1970).
30 See note 26, supra.
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,euphoric effects of the plant's use which are
:the object of the prohibition and since no lay
person could distinguish between one species
,of marijuana and another, the decisions which
reject the "one species prohibited" argument
are probably better reasoned. To agree with
the LewaUen decision could result in further
constitutional problems. The government would
incarcerate persons who obtain a cannabinol
high from sativa L. but not prosecute those
who obtain the same high from another spe-
cies. Additionally, since no lay person could tell
the difference between the species, due process
notice requirements would not be met.31
From these decisions one can conclude that
the courts make poor vehicles for change in
drug laws. Judicial integrity and principled
decision-making are threatened by laws which
are either not enforced or strangely inter-
preted. If the substantive offense of the use of
marijuana is to be modified or eliminated, it
can only be done at the legislative level. Re-
cent developments suggest that such a change
may be forthcoming. 32 While the debate con-
tinues as to the possible adverse medical effects
of marijuana use, the adverse legal and social
consequences of a marijuana arrest and convic-
tion make it a dangerous drug indeed.
ABDUCTION TO OBTAIN JURISDICTION
The second circuit has once again con-
fronted and approved an old-fashioned type of
lawlessness in law enforcement-the -interna-
tional kidnapping of a person accused of a
crime, and his forcible abduction into the ju-
risdiction whose law has allegedly been
violated. 33 In order for a court to gain juris-
diction of a criminal matter, it must have the
presence3 4 in court of the accused. In Lujan v.
31 The court in United States v. Walton, -
F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1975), held that the 1970 Con-
trolled Substances Act's proscription of cannabis
sativa L. applies to all marijuana. It also noted the
equal protection and due process problems with a
decision of the Lewallen type. Id. at -
32 White House Announces Its New Perspec-
tives on Pot, 16 BNA CRIbi. L. REP. 2183 (1974).
33 The most infamous example of such a kidnap-
ping in modern times is the Israeli abduction of
Adolf Eichman in 1960. The account is retold in
M. PEARLMAN, TnE CAPTURE AND TRIAL OF
ADOLF EICHMAN (1963).
3 Constructive presence may be sufficient; trial
in absentia is possible. See Drope v. Missouri,
S.W. 2d (Mo. 1975).
Gengler3 5 the second circuit held that it had
such jurisdiction, despite the extenuating cir-
cumstances. The defendant, an Argentine citi-
zen indicted in the United States on conspir-
acy charges involving the importation of
heroin, was successfully lured into Bolivia by
American narcotics agents where Bolivian po-
lice, paid by the American agents, arrested
him. He was later placed on board a plane
bound for New York City.
Conceding that the arrest warrant was en-
forced in an unconventional manner, the court,
speaking through Judge Kaufman, nevertheless
held that a court's jurisdiction is unaffected by
the manner in which a defendant is brought
before it. Absent any allegations of government
conduct amounting to torture or brutality,
there is no cause for the court to divest itself
of jurisdiction or to dismiss the indictment.
Only last May the second circuit's reversal
of the conviction in United States v.
Toscanino36 had indicated that the exclusion-
ary rule, usually applied to evidence obtained
in violation of the fourth amendment,37 would
also be applied to defendants illegally brought
into the jurisdiction. Prior to Toscanino it was
settled doctrine under the rule announced in
Ker v. Illinois38 and later affirmed in Frisbie
v. Collins,3 9 that the government's power to
prosecute a defendant was not impaired by any
illegality in the method used to acquire control
over him.40 In Ker, the defendant was kid-
napped in Peru by an Illinois Pinkerton agent
who failed to present the proper extradition
papers. After a trial in Illinois, the defendant
sought to have his conviction reversed. The
Supreme Court held that under these circum-
stances, due process of law was satisfied as
long as a person present in court is convicted
after a fair trial in accordance with consti-
tutional procedural safeguards. The Court has
35 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
s6 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). See also Recent
Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1975).
37 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
39 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
39342 U.S. 519 (1952). See The Supreme
Court, The 1951 Term, 66 HARV. L. REv. 89, 126
(1952).
40 Legal extradition is of course the usual
method for obtaining a fugitive from justice. The
Constitution so provides. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2.
[Vol. 66
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never abandoned the Ker principle,41 and it
has been widely reasserted by the circuits.
42
In Toscanino43 the Second Circuit, presented
with particularly egregious police conduct,
grafted the due process considerations of Ro-
chin v. California44 and the exclusionary rule
of Mapp v. Ohio 45 on to the jurisdictional
question. Toscanino had alleged (and the court
accepted as true) that paid agents of the
United States had forcibly abducted him from
Uruguay. He was held incommunicado for sev-
enteen days in Brazil during which time the
agents alternatively interrogated and tortured
him. 40 All this occurred under the direction of
the Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcot-
ics and .Dangerous Drugs. He was not for-
mally arrested until his arrival in New York.
The court held that if a defendant proves
this type of allegation, the government should,
as a matter of fundamental fairness, be obli-
gated to return him to his status quo ante. The
court was unable to reconcile the decisions in
Ker and its progeny with the policy of dis-
couraging official lawlessness as manifested by
Mapp and Rochin.4 7 The defendant's presence
in the court was analogized to the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" 48 and dismissal of the case
against him was, in the court's view, war-
ranted in order to deter future police miscon-
41 See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
42 United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1974);
United States ex rel. Calhoun v. Twomey, 454 F.2d
326 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Caramian,
468 F.2d 1370 (5th Cir. 1972); Devine v. Hand,
287 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1961); United States ex
rel. Langer v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1956) ;
Chander v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949) ; Sheehan
v. Huff, 142 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 764 (1944).
43 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).44 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
45 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
48 The torture allegedly included sensory depri-
vation, intravenous feeding, fingers pinched with
metal pliers, fluids forced into anal passages and
electric shock administered to earlobes, toes and
genitals.
47 The analysis adopted by the court was first
suggested in Scott, Criminal Jurisdiction of a
State over a Defendant Based upon Presence Se-
cured by Force or Fraud, 37 MiNN. L. REv. 91
(1953).
48 See Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"
Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CAL. L. REv. 579,
599 (1968).
duct. The court, relying on its supervisory
powers over the administration of the criminal
justice system, refused to become an "accom-
plice in the willful disobedience of law."
40
The most expansive argument in Toscanino
was the court's assertion that the Ker-Frisbie-
doctrine had been so weakened by the Rochin,
Mapp and RwsseU50 cases that it would not
apply where a defendant had been brought into
the court's jurisdiction in violation of a
treaty.5' Therefore, judicial scrutiny of illegal
police conduct was necessary and dismissal to
prevent any beneficial effects from illegal po-
lice conduct was justified. The court also anal-
ogized the criminal law jurisdiction to that of
civil law, where it is well settled that the de-
fendant who is lured into another state by
fraud or forced against his will should not be
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of that
state.
52
While Toscanino clearly includes more due
process considerations into the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine, other than merely a fair trial, Lujair
makes it equally clear that jurisdiction will be
divested only in light of shocking governmen-
tal conduct. The treatment of the defendant
Lujan failed to meet this test. The Second Cir-
cuit held that divestiture of jurisdiction is only
applicable in those cases that present egregious
factual situations involving torture, brutality or
some form of an official protest to the violation
of an extradition treaty by a foreign govern-
ment. Lujan's arrest and abduction was merely
illegal, involving none of these added consider-
ations. There were no allegations of shocking
treatment. There was no protest given by the
Argentine government.
The Lujan limitation on Toscanino is rea-
sonable. First, violation of a treaty should not,
in and of itself, clothe the defendant with any
immunity from prosecution. International kid-
napping violates the sovereignty of the nation
from which the defendant was taken. The
40 500 F2d at 276.
50 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 430-
31 (1973) (entrapment).
51 The court found that the actions there vio-
lated the United Nations Charter, the Charter of
the Organization of American States, and the
United States-Uruguay extradition treaty.




standing to complain belongs exclusively to
that government. Second, to redress the loss of
any rights, the defendant may institute a civil
suit for damages. 53 Moreover, the threat of
such damage suits (although remote as a prac-
tical matter), coupled with the inadmissibility
of any evidence discovered as a result of the
illegal arrest will provide the same deterrance
as would a blanket rule divesting jurisdiction.
Third, the criminal law is intrinsically differ-
ent from the civil law (where the plaintiff is
not allowed to profit from his wrongdoing)
because of the state's overriding interest in
bringing fugitives to justice. In the criminal
area, only brutal or shocking police conduct
should be subject to the Toscanino remedy.
54
Despite the Lujan clarification, the essential
force of Toscanino continues. There remains
the same treatment of the defendant whose
presence was brutally obtained as of evidence
illegally obtained-the court will exclude them
both.55
SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS
The intricacies of the equal protection
clause F and the "spectrum of standards" 57 for
reviewing alleged discrimination continue to
cause difficulty for courts faced with deciding
attacks on statutes imposing sex-based classifi-
cations. Equal protection may be invoked to
ensure that a statutory classification which re-
53 Brooks v. Blackledge, 353 F. Supp. 955, 957
(W.D. N.C. 1973) (dictum).
54 The second circuit's interpretation of the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine was adopted by the northern
district of Illinois in the recent decision of United
States v. Marzano, 388 F. Supp. 906 (N.D. Ill.
1975). There the court denied a motion to sup-
press made by the defendants in the Purolator
vault theft who alleged that they were returned to
the United States from the Cayman Islands in vio-
lation of the American-British extradition treaty.
Citing Lujan, the district court limited Toscanino
to instances of brutal police conduct.
55 But see United States v. Cotton, 471 F.2d 744
(9th Cir. 1973). Defendant, illegally arrested by
Vietnamese officials and turned over to United
States officials, was flown in chains back to the
United States to face charges of theft of govern-
ment property. The court rejected the defendant's
argument that the same analysis which supports
the exclusionary rule supports dismissal of the
charges, stating that the remedy is not an ouster
of jurisdiction.
56 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
57 San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
sults in different treatment for groups other-
wise similarly situated bears an adequate rela-
tionship to the purposes the classification is
intended to serve. Once a court has determined
that a classification discriminates on the basis
of sex, it must then decide what standard of
review is appropriate to test that discrimina-
tion. Whether sex has joined the group of
statutory classifications which require strict ju-
dicial scrutiny is not yet clear.58 A review of
several recent cases exposes the difficulty the
courts are having with this type of challenge.
In State v. Devall59 the Louisiana supreme
court upheld a "females only" prostitution
statute90 against a female defendant's challenge
that the failure to ban men from practicing in-
discriminate sexual intercourse for pay violated
the equal protection clause. The court conceded
that a man could not violate the statute by ac-
cepting compensation for his sexual favors.
However, in reversing the trial court's deter-
mination that the statute does unconstitu-
tionally discriminate, the state supreme court
apparently chose the traditional "old" equal
protection test of minimal rationality."'
Under the minimal rationality test a court
will not set aside a classification if any reason-
able set of facts may be conceived to justify
it.62 Empirical realities need not dictate the par-
ticular solution chosen nor is the over- or
under-inclusiveness of the classification scruti-
nized. The Louisiana court, applying this test,
reasoned that the legislature was free to ex-
clude male prostitution from the coverage of
58 One student has written that much of the
confusion in the area of sex discrimination has
been encouraged by the absence of clear guidance
from the Supreme Court. Comment, Pregnancy
and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62
CAL. L. Rav. 1532 (1974). This work also pro-
vides a concise explanation of the various equal
protection tests. Id. at 1537-41.
59 __ La.__ 302 So. 2d 909 (1974).
60 "Prostitution is the practice by a female of
indiscriminate sexual intercourse with males for
compensation." LA. REv. STAT. § 14:82 (1950).
61 La. at , 302 So. 2d at 912, citing Goe-
sart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1947) (Michigan
statute which provided that no woman could ob-
tain a bartender's license unless she was the wife
or daughter of the male owner held not to violate
equal protection). The Goesart decision is of ques-
tionable continued validity in light of more recent
cases. See Sail 'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1,




the statute on the basis that it did not consti-
tute a significant social problem. Absent a
showing that the sex-based distinction involv-
ing prostitutes is merely a pretext designed to
effect an invidious discrimination against mem-
bers of one sex,63 the Louisiana legislators
were free to make the classification. 4
In a carefully reasoned dissent, Chief Justice
Sanders noted that male prostitution does in-
deed exist in Louisiana.65 Reasoning that pros-
titution laws are meant to prevent the spread
of venereal disease, to shield citizens from an-
noyance and to control related crimes (such as
illicit drugs, gambling and organized crime),
the dissent found that male prostitution con-
tributes to these evils on par with female pros-
titution. The dissent would have found the
statute violative -of equal protection, thereby
concluding that the sex classification bears no
rational relation to the objectives of the
legislature.66
Devaol demonstrates the importance of which
standard of review the court decides to use.
Because the more lenient rational basis test
was used the state's classification was upheld.
6 7
The court could have found sex to be a "sus-
pect classification" and applied a more rigor-
O The Louisiana court here confuses the tests
under equal protection. Since the classification was
deemed not suspect, the proper question was
whether the statute was rational or irrational. In-
vidiousness is relevant only in suspect classification
standards. It is possible that the court meant that
a statute with a bad motive is irrational. The
opinion, however, is unclear.
64 Other state supreme courts that have upheld
unisex prostitution statutes include Indiana, Wilson
v. State, 258 Ind. 3, 278 N.E. 2d 569 (1972), cert.
denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1973), and Wisconsin, State
v. Mertes, 60 Wis. 2d 414, 210 N.W.2d 741
(1973). An Arizona rape statute applicable only to
male defendants with female victims was recently
upheld against an equal protection challenge. State
v. Kelly, 111 Ariz. 181, 526 P.2d 720 (1974). The
court applied a rationality test to find that the legis-
lature need not protect males from female rapists.
65-. La. at -, 302 So. 2d at 913. The dissent
cites to a valuable and exhaustive study in Ro-
senbleet & Pariente, The Prostitution of the Crini-
nal Ldw, 11 Amm. Ca m. L. REv. 373, 396 (1973).
66 Other courts have agreed that unilateral pros-
titution statutes violate equal protection. See e.g.,
State v. Fields, - P.2d - (Alaska 1973). A con-
stitutional attack on prostitution laws in general is
set out in Rosenbleet & Priente, supra note 65, at
376.
67 Reversals of state action under this standard
are traditionally scarce. See Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457 (1957).
ous standard. Under this second standard,
strict judicial scrutiny is given to a classifica-
tion based on any suspect criterion, such as
race"6 or alienage.60 Fundamental interests,
such as voting 70 and the rights of the criminal
defendant 71 have also been recognized as re-
quiring heightened judicial scrutiny. To be up-
held under this standard of review, the classifi-
cation must serve a compelling interest, and it
must be shown that the classification is neces-
sary in order to fulfill this interest. Had the
Devall majority found sex to be a suspect clas-
sification, the statute would have fallen.
A District of Columbia trial court, finding
sex to be a suspect classification, has struck
down a city ordinance72 (aimed at massage
parlors) as violative of the equal protection
clause. In Geisha House, Inc. v. Wilson 3 the
court found that there was no compelling in-
terest in prohibiting members of one sex from
administering massages to the other. Because
the sex-based classification is suspect,7 4 the
court insisted upon the least intrusive means to
accomplish the goals of the statute. The court
indicated that a statute which prevented em-
ployment of persons with records of past crim-
inal sexual conduct, or which would require li-
censing of individual masseuses or masseurs,
or which regulated the dress of customers would
have been more favorably received.7 5 The strict
68 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
69 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
70 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
71 See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
72 D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-2311 (1967) prohibits
any female from administering a massage to any
male or any male from administering any massage
to any female in an establishment licensed under
the statute.
73 16 BNA CR. L. REP. 2048 (D.C. Super. Ct.
Sep. 25 1974).
74 [S~ince sex, like race and national origin, is
an immutable characteristic determined solely
by the accident of birth, the imposition of spe-
cial disabilities upon the members of the par-
ticular sex because of their sex would seem to
violate the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility ....
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973),
cited in Geisha House, Inc. v. Wilson, 16 BNA
Ca. L. RP,. at 2050.
75 The court further found that the statute, by
creating a presumption that the illicit activity oc-




scrutiny of sex-based classifications has also
resulted in the overturning of Pennsylvania's
discriminating sentencing procedure for female
defendants.
7 6
A third standard of review in equal protec-
tion decisions, labelled by one commentator as
the "newer equal protection," 77 is demon-
strated by the eastern district of Pennsylva-
nia's decision in Colorado Springs Amusement,
Ltd. v. Rizzo.78 An ordinance similar to the
one considered in Geisha House, forbidding
employees in massage parlors from tending to
persons of the opposite sex, was held to be in
violation of the equal protection clause. Even
though the court conceded that the city of
Philadelphia had a valid interest in prohibiting
illicit sexual behavior, the court scrutinized the
means employed in the ordinance to achieve
that goal and found it to be overly
restrictive.79 The court did not apply the "sex
as a suspect classification" test which automati-
cally would have meant the unconstitutionality
of the statute.8 0
76 See Commonwealth v. Butler, - Pa. _ 328
A.2d 851 (1974).
77 Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-
Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARv. I . R~v. 1 (1972).
78 387 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
79 The court, using a due process analysis, also
found a "fundamental right" to operate a massage
parlor. Under this analysis, the state's failure to
demonstrate a compelling interest in the manner in
which it chose to regulate the activity was fatal.
However, in light of the decision in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), it is doubtful whether there are
"fundamental rights" beyond those explicitly an-
nounced in the Constitution.
80 According to one leading constitutional au-
thority, use of the suspect classification has been
This third approach exemplified by the Col-
orado Springs decision seems most in step
with recent Supreme Court decisions involving
sex-based classifications. 8' This, in practice, be-
comes a sliding scale test where both the inter-
ests affected by the legislative classification and
the particular characteristics of the class are
compared with the interests of the state in
maintaining the particular regulating scheme
as a means by which it reaches its goals.8 2
Under this test, a statute which draws a dis-
tinction by sex would be valid provided that
the court could ascertain the existence of a
substantial and rational link between the classi-
fication and the asserted state purpose.8 3 The
contours of this standard, however, are as yet
undetermined.
It is difficult to reconcile the decisions in
Devall with those in Geisha House and Colo-
rado Springs Amusement. Until the Supreme
Court announces a clearer standard for review
of equal protection challenges to sex classifica-
tions, confusion in the lower courts will re-
main.
strict in theory and fatal in fact. Gunther, supra
note 77, at 8.8 1 See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974) ; Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974) ; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
82 See Gunther, supra note 77.
83 Four Supreme Court justices in Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), found sex to be
a "suspect classification." In Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971), the sex-based classification re-
quired a "fair and substantial relation" between
the distinction drawn and the purpose for which it
was drawn. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974), the Court found that a statute, which sin-
gled out pregnancy as the only significant disabil-
ity not covered by the state-wide insurance pro-
gram, was not a sex-based classification.
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